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Introduction
After fueling a luxury car with gas worth $49.90 the driver hands a $50 bill to the station attendant and says "keep the change". The attendant takes 10 cents out of his pocket and throws the coin into the trashcan next to the driver.
People are willing to exercise threats that ex ante influence others to act in their favor. In the anecdote, the station attendant's blatant action possibly makes the driver feel bad. It is a costly action but non-credible as a threat, because it does not affect the driver's payoff. A counterexample of influence through credible threats is the ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982) . Here proposer P has to split a surplus between himself and responder R, passing some and keeping the rest. R can reject P's offer, reducing P's payoff to zero. This threat strategically influences P: the more likely rejection is, the more P offers to avoid rejection. Thus, R's threat influences P's behavior and in turn R's payoff.
In this letter, we show that mere psychological threats can also influence behavior, where, R is a "passive" player whose action leaves P's payoff unchanged, and where P can only be influenced psychologically. To validate such psychological influence and to understand how it operates, we experimentally compare behavior across dictator (DG) and impunity games (IG; Bolton and Zwick, 1995) where strategic influence holds constant, but psychological influence varies.
Our benchmark is the DG, where P has to split a surplus, but R has no available action, i.e. R must accept any offer by P. Thus, R has no strategic or psychological influence. In IGs, P also has to split a surplus, but R can reject P's offer. If R rejects, then R receives nothing, but P still gets to keep his share as in the DG. P thus acts under impunity. However, if we observe that proposals vary across games, then it shows that R has psychological influence.
We further test if P's sensitivity to psychological threats depends on whether or not he finds out that expectations have actually been met. In our IG with complete information (IG-CI), P receives feedback on R's decision. It differs from Bolton and Zwick's IG in this respect. Here, R may psychologically influence P to ensure acceptance by raising offers. In the IG with incomplete information (IG-II), R may reject P's offer but P does not get information about R's decision. R's psychological influence may diminish, because P's utility from R's payoff becomes uncertain. So, we identify preferences and mechanisms that explain psychological influence.
Preferences
A purely self-interested P prefers more to less and so offers R nothing in the DG. P also offers R nothing in the IGs, because R cannot affect P's payoff. Consider preferences beyond pure self-interest. Altruism implies that utility increases with a co-player's payoff (Breitmoser and Tan, 2013) . Under fairness concerns utility increases when differences in payoffs are decreased (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) . Efficiency concerns suggest that utility increases with social welfare (Kritikos and Bolle, 2001; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) . Guilt aversion implies that one has second order beliefs about outcomes that co-players expect (first order beliefs), and experiences disutility by generating inferior co-player outcomes (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) .
First, let us assume that preferences are symmetric across roles and solve games backward. In DGs, R makes no decision. In IGs, an altruistic R will not reject offers because it decreases both players' utility. With fairness or with spite, R accepts any offer: rejection leaves P's payoff unchanged but reduces R's payoff, increases inequity, and results in higher disutility. 2 With efficiency concerns, rejections are inefficient and reduce utility, implying that all offers will be accepted. Backward inducing, P expects R to always accept under all preferences. Thus, the option to reject will not change offers in the IGs relative to those in the DGs. Now, let us relax the assumption that preferences are symmetric across roles.
Assume that P anticipates that R suffers disutility from accepting less than expected and rejects the offer if it outweighs the utility from the money offered. This is compatible with guilt aversion arguments that P has second order beliefs of what R believes P should offer, and that P suffers disutility if he offers R less than what he thinks she expects. Moreover, the inefficiency of destroying money by rejection also inflicts disutility on P if he is concerned about efficiency. Depending on the expected disutility from rejection relative to the disutility from monetary sacrifice, P will either offer more to increase the probability of acceptance or offer nothing to avoid waste from rejection. It pays off to increase offers if P is sufficiently sensitive to R's rejection, and R is sufficiently sensitive to P's offers. However, without feedback in IG-II, P cannot verify R's response, so he will not be exposed to R's rejection. Ex post, guilt aversion plays a weaker role in IG-II than in IG-CI. Therefore, if prior and posterior higher order beliefs differ, then P will ex ante be more sensitive to psychological threats "realizable" with feedback. In turn, P may offer more in IG-CI.
Experiment
The experiment was conducted at a German university with subjects drawn from a pool of economics undergraduates recruited by email and lectures. Each subject participated once. Subjects were randomly allocated to two different rooms on arrival, separated by proposers and responders in all games. We conducted three sessions, one per treatment, with a total of 280 subjects: 80 in DG, 100 in IG-CI, and 100 in IG-II.
After subjects were given instruction sheets and briefed, they completed a control questionnaire to verify understanding, and then proceeded. 3 We provided subjects with cubicles for privacy. To avoid focality effects, making 50-50 splits salient, proposers were asked to split an odd numbered S=19.55 experimental currency units (€1=1.955ECU). P received an envelope with the instructions and surplus in various denominations. P then left R an offer in the envelope and stated choices on decision sheets for our records.
Decision sheets were marked with pseudonyms chosen by the participants and returned to the envelopes, collected by the experimental assistants and deposited in a box. Two experimental assistants in a third room checked the amount in each envelope against that stated on the decision sheet. The box was transferred to the other room and envelopes were randomly distributed among subjects playing R.
Rs in the DG took the money and left. Rs in IGs were asked to either take or leave cash in the envelope as desired. Envelopes were collected and respective Ps received feedback in the IG-CI. Subjects were paid anonymously to avoid the pressure of social observation (Bolton and Zwick, 1995) . Subjects received a €5
show-up fee plus game earnings, averaging €9 for 30-45min. offers average around 20%. The distribution of offers is skewed to the left with offers above 50% rarely observed. Zero offers are common. The mean offer in our DG is 20.4%. Baseline observations are thus comparable.
Results
<Insert Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 about here> P makes mean offers of 15.7% in the IG-II, significantly lower than in the DG (Mann Whitney U: z=-1.892; p=0.029, 1-tail henceforth). And while we observe a slightly left-skewed, but relatively even distribution of offers in the DG between zero and the equal split, in the IG-II almost nobody (2 of 50 subjects) made "small" offers below 10% (Figure 1 ) with one offer (of 1%) being rejected. So, the IG-II distribution is more skewed to the left (significant at p=0.015), and significantly more subjects offered 0 in the IG-II (44%) than in the DG (10%) (Fisher's: p=0.0003).
In the IG-CI, P makes average offers of 22.2%, significantly higher than in the IG-II (p=0.043), but not different from the DG (p=0.478). Here, 7 responders were offered up to 10%, 6 of them rejected the surplus, while all offers above 10% were accepted. Moreover, we observe contrasting distributions with a bimodal distribution for IG-CI at 0 and towards the equal split, confirmed by a Siegel-Tukey test of extreme values (z=-2.14; p<0.05). Fisher's tests also show that in comparison to the DG in the IG-CI there are significantly more subjects at the extreme points of 0 (10% in DG versus 26% in IG-CI; p=0.046) and ½ (12% in DG versus 28% in IG-CI; p=0.064), A Moses test of extreme reactions reveals a significantly more leftward bias in IG-II than in IG-CI (p=0.004). Consequently, in the IG-II a significantly lower share of 10% offered ½ (Fisher's: p=0.02).
Conclusion
We find evidence for psychological influence: R can influence P's behavior, even if rejection does not affect P's payoff. In impunity games with feedback, P either raises offers relative to the DG to ensure acceptance or offers nothing. Put differently, R has influence because she can throw a tantrum by destroying money. So, P can either choose to be held hostage by his generosity thereby surrendering his impunity by offering more, or self-select out of this risk thereby maintaining his impunity by offering nothing. Thus, emotional responses form credible threats that psychologically influence behavior through efficiency concerns and guilt aversion.
Our observations, however, also suggest that guilt aversion plays a weaker role when P cannot update his beliefs concerning R's acceptance or rejection: then high offers become less frequent, while zero offers become more frequent. Put differently, P is more sensitive to guilt when he can actually experience rejection and verify ex post that he has let R down than when he merely believes ex ante that he might let R down. This confirms that the act of rejection serves as a credible psychological threat -when it is observable. 
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